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Fictional and Aesthetic Objects: 
Meinong’s Point of View
Venanzio Raspa
In contemporary philosophy there are a great many texts on aesthetics
and the ontology of narrative discourse, that discuss Meinong’s theses,
agreeing or disagreeing. But Meinong never wrote a single book or
article on aesthetics or the ontology of art works, nor did he provide a
structured system to deal with fictional aesthetic objects. What he
wrote on these matters is to be found in texts dealing with the wide
horizon represented by object theory. To assess whether object theory
provides the right tools for the treatment of fictional aesthetic objects
and hence deserves to be looked at in greater depth and developed fur-
ther, I have thought fit to consider certain critical points from a gener-
al point of view, passing over specific analyses.
Meinong does not use the term ‘fictional,’ indeed he only speaks of
‘aesthetic objects’; having brought together the two terms to delimit
my discourse, I will not deal with fictitious objects in their totality, but
only with the subclass of fictional aesthetic objects. By ‘fictional’ I
mean ‘figuring in fiction,’ i.e. in a story or narrative context – of course
not all that is fictitious is necessarily given in a narrative context;
whereas by ‘aesthetic object’ I mean an object with aesthetic properties
– and again, not all that is fictitious (including the fictional) is also nec-
essarily an aesthetic object. Meinong himself refers above all to litera-
ture, sometimes to music, seldom to the visual arts, when he speaks of
aesthetic objects.
1. Meinong’s discourse on fictional objects follows from certain
fundamental theses of object theory. Such theses, put forward for the
first time in ‘The Theory of Objects [Über Gegenstandstheorie]’
(1904), mainly come out of a process of theoretical elaboration which
began years before, especially with ‘On Objects of Higher Order and
their Relationship to Internal Perception [Über Gegenstände höherer
Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung]’ (1899) and
On Assumptions [Ueber Annahmen] (1902)1. Later they underwent
further development, but were never abandoned. Here I take them as
premises, and do no more than set them out, without going into detail2.
First of all, Meinong embraces Brentano’s thesis of intentionality,
according to which every mental phenomenon (representation, judg-
ment, feeling or desire) is directed towards an object3:
For no one doubts that we cannot have a representation, without having a rep-
resentation of something, and likewise, that we cannot judge without judging
something4.
This intentional character secures an autonomous and specific domain
for the mental and allows it to be distinguished from the physical. To
these two classes Meinong adds a third, that of ideal objects, which are
neither physical nor mental. He comes to this, following Twardowski,
by connecting the intentionality thesis with the distinction between the
act, content and object of a representation5.
1 Meinong’s works, except the first edition of Ueber Annahmen (1902), are quot-
ed from the Alexius Meinong Gesamtausgabe (1968-1978), abbreviated as GA.
Translations are mine, unless indicated otherwise; references to English transla-
tions appear in brackets.
2 But cf. the already classic texts by Findlay 19632 and Grossmann 1974; for
more specific logical aspects, see Lambert 1983 and Jacquette 1996. A brief expo-
sition of the main theses of object theory can be found in Raspa 2006.
3 Cf. Brentano 18741/1924-19282: I, 124 ff., 136 ff.; II, 32.
4 Meinong 1899: GA II, 381 (1978: 141). Cf. also Meinong 1904: GA II, 381
(1960: 76): ‘That knowing is impossible without something being known, and
more generally, that judgments and ideas or representations (Vorstellungen) are
impossible without being judgments about and representations of something, is
revealed to be self-evident;’; 1905: GA I, 582: ‘one cannot be cheered up without
being glad about something. Hence one cannot feel any joy, without apprehend-
ing such a ‘something’, an object’ (see infra, fn. 8); 1921: GA VII, 15. 1974: 224.
I translate ‘Vorstellung’ with ‘representation’, and not with ‘idea’ (like Schubert-
Kalsi) or ‘presentation’ (like Levi, Terrell and Chisholm), because we find in
Meinong both the terms ‘Idee’ and ‘Präsentation’. On this question cf. Lindenfeld
1980: 17, fn. 6.
5 Cf. e.g. Twardowski 1894: 3-4, 12, 18 (1977: 1-2, 10, 16); Meinong 1899: GA
II, 381 ff. (1978: 141 ff.).
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An act is a psychical experience (Erlebnis) directed toward an
object; content is that part of such an experience that varies or remains
constant with the object, and in dependence upon it6; the object is, still
following Twardowski7, the summum genus, in other words that some-
thing to which no other concept is superordinate8. This is fundamental
because it means that anything that can be apprehended by a mental
experience or expressed by language is an object; but furthermore that
‘object’ for Meinong is not binding as regards the being or essence of
something.
Meinong can then distinguish between what exists and what – while
either subsisting or being outside of being (außerseiend) – does not:
existence is characterized by persistence in time, and is a predicate not
possessed by all objects; so there are objects that, rather than existing,
only subsist, having no spatio-temporal determination (such as the
objects of mathematics)9, as well as objects that neither exist nor sub-
sist, and hence are outside of being (impossible objects). Being can
hence be either existence or subsistence.
Such distinctions imply a criticism of the prejudice in favour of exis-
tence or being10, according to which ‘we may speak of a so-being
6 Cf. Meinong 1899: GA II, 384 (1978: 142-143); 1917: GA III, 339 ff., 347 f.
(1972: 49 ff., 55 f.).
7 Cf. Twardowski 1894: 37, 38, 40 (1977: 34, 35, 37).
8 Cf. Meinong 1921: GA VII, 14 (1974: 224). According to Meinong (1904: GA
II, 483-484 (1960: 77)), there is an equivalence between ‘object’ and ‘something’.
This meaning of object is similar to that of object in general (Gegenstand über-
haupt) found in the Critique of Pure Reason: the concept of an object in general
– affirms Kant (17811-17872: A 290 = B 346) at the end of the Transcendental
Analytic – is the highest concept (beyond the dichotomy of possible and impossi-
ble), with which it remains undecided whether the object is something or nothing.
9 Cf. Meinong 1902: 189 = GA IV, 467; 1904: GA II, 519 (1960: 108); 1906: GA
V, 377 fn. 2, 387-388; 1910: GA IV, 64, 74-75 (1983: 52, 58-59); 1915: GA VI,
56-57, 61 ff.; 1918: GA V, 544; 1921: GA VII, 20-21 (1974: 228).
10 Actually Meinong speaks of a ‘prejudice in favour of the real’ (1904: GA II,
485, 505 (1960: 78, 96); 1906-1907: GA V, 235, 255), or ‘of the knowledge of
reality’ (1904: GA II, 488 (1960: 81)), in addition to a ‘prejudice in favour of exis-
tence’ (1904: GA II, 489, 494 (1960: 82, 86); 1915: GA VI, 181, 201), or ‘of
being’ (1904: GA II, 494 (1960: 86)). According to him ‘existence’, ‘reality’ and
(Sosein) only if a being (Sein) is always presupposed’11, and only real-
ity is worthy of theoretical treatment12. They conversely presuppose
the postulation of an existence-free science (daseinsfreie
Wissenschaft), that is ‘an aprioristic science, independent from experi-
ence’13. The concept of Daseinsfreiheit finds expression in two funda-
mental principles: the principle of independence of so-being from
being and the principle of the Außersein. According to the former
the so-being (Sosein) of an object is not affected by its non-being (Nichtsein).
[…] this principle applies, not only to objects which do not exist in fact, but
also to objects which could not exist because they are impossible14.
The other principle, of Außersein, often translated as ‘principle of the
indifference of pure object to being’, affirms that
the object as such, [...] the pure object, stands ‘beyond being and non-being.’
[...] The object is by nature outside of being [or indifferent to being (außer-
seiend)], although at least one of its two objectives of being, the Object’s being
or non-being, in every case subsists15.
Later on I will explain what Meinong means by Außersein. Regarding
the classification of objects, in addition to the above ontological one,
Meinong also gives a gnoseological one: namely the classification of
objects according to the psychical experiences that apprehend them, so
that ‘objecta’ (Objekte) are the objects of representations, ‘objectives’
(Objektive) those of thoughts (judgments and assumptions), ‘dignita-
tives’ (Dignitative) those of feelings, and ‘desideratives’ (Desiderative)
those of desires. We can concentrate on the first two classes of objects.
The former, the objecta, can be objects of lower or of higher order,
these last being characterized by an ‘intrinsic non-independence’
‘being’ are not synonymous, but they are, in order, concepts with an increasing
extension. This use of different expressions is not a symptom of linguistic inac-
curacy or lack of conceptual clarity; rather, they are indicative of the various lev-
els in which the prejudice operates (cf. Barbero & Raspa (eds.) 2005: 7-8).
11 Meinong 1904: GA II, 489 (1960: 82).
12 Cf. Meinong 1904: GA II, 486 (1960: 79).
13 Meinong 1906-1907: GA V, 239, 256-257.
14 Meinong 1904: GA II, 489, 490 (1960: 82).
15 Meinong 1904: GA II, 493-494 (1960: 86); the translation has been slightly
modified (V.R).
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(innere Unselbständigkeit)16, because they can only be thought in ref-
erence to other objects, on which they are built. They can be both ideal,
like the relation of similarity between two things, and real, like the
combination between a colour and an extension. What can exist is
real17, what can subsist ideal18. Objectives are also objects of higher
order: as judgment needs representations as its essential basis, so the
objective needs objecta; in fact an objective can also be the inferius of
another objective, but at the end of the downward series we always
find objecta, by the principle of obligatory infima19. Unlike objecta,
which can exist or not, objectives can never exist as a piece of reality
next to the objecta that occur in them, but they can only subsist, when
they are true.
I have stated known Meinongian principles and definitions that I
will use later on. I have done this for two reasons: because the dis-
course that I will develop is of a hypothetical kind, in the sense that,
having assumed certain ontological theses, it investigates their conse-
quences of an aesthetic nature; and because, since the non-acceptance
of the presuppositions means that we can (not necessarily that we
must) disagree on the results, proceeding in this way helps to make
clear the points of divergence. My paper is structured in three parts,
each of which moves from a polemic that involved Meinong; therefore,
the theory is immediately subjected to a first verification. Each part
intends to answer a question: (i) what kind of existence or of being is
possessed by fictional aesthetic objects? (ii) what kind of objects are
fictional aesthetic objects? (iii) what makes a fictional object an aes-
thetic one? 
2. Let us begin with the first question: what kind of existence or
of being is possessed by fictional aesthetic objects? To enter directly
in medias res, we should consider the following passage:
16 Meinong 1899: GA II, 386 (1978: 144).
17 Cf. Meinong 1899: GA II, 394 (1978: 150).
18 Cf. Meinong 1899: GA II, 395 (1978: 150).
19 Cf. Meinong 1910: GA IV, 62-63 (1983: 50-51); 1917: GA III, 389-390 (1972:
94); 1921: GA VII, 17 (1974: 226).
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I know that Goethe’s Mephistus is a mere poetic form, that there has never been
a Mephistus, that therefore none of the words that Goethe makes him say have
ever been uttered by him. Nevertheless, I can discuss how Mephistus replies to
Faust or to the Lord in a certain passage. I can say that he ‘effectively’ responds
in a certain way and not in another.
And it should be noted that with this I do not want to formulate a judgment
either on my or on Goethe’s imaginative activity, but I formulate it on the per-
son of Mephistus. […] for me or for my consciousness Mephistus’ answer does
not belong to the past, but to the immediate present. Contrarily, Goethe’s imag-
inative activity is without doubt a past fact.
On the other hand, I do not speak at all of the historical Mephistus, but rather
of Goethe’s, or more precisely of the Mephistus of the story. But he has a pecu-
liar form of existence. Without any doubt he was once called into existence by
Goethe. But having been called into existence and having reached artistic rep-
resentation in the words of literature, he has a type of reality; what he does and
says is in a certain sense beyond any doubt a verifiable ‘fact’20.
What type of reality does Mephistus have? An ‘aesthetic reality’
(ästhetische Wirklichkeit), is the answer of the author of this passage,
where the adjective ‘aesthetic’ means that what is concerned is an
invented reality, that does not have anything to do with the real world,
but only with its being thought, therefore it can also be defined as an
‘existence for me’ (Dasein für mich)21. It is not Meinong who is talk-
ing, but one of his contemporaries, the philosopher Theodor Lipps, in
an essay of 1905 ‘Weiteres zur ‘Einfühlung’ [Further considerations on
‘Empathy’]’, in which Meinong is called to account on questions
regarding judgement-feelings, aesthetic feelings and aesthetic pleas-
ure. Meinong responds to Lipps the same year with an article pub-
lished in the same review, the Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, and
entitled ‘Judgement-feelings: what they are and what they are not
[Über Urteilsgefühle: was sie sind und was sie nicht sind].’ This was
written shortly after the publication of the essay ‘The Theory of
Objects’, and it not only presents an aesthetic application of object-
20 Lipps 1905: 487-488.
21 Cf. Lipps 1905: 489; 1906: 27.
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theoretical concepts which were presented in that essay, but it also
anticipates many elements that will be developed more completely in
Meinong’s mature works. I will not follow the whole development of
the polemic, which continued with another article published by Lipps
the following year under a similar title, ‘On ‘Judgement-feelings’
[Über ‘Urteilsgefühle’]’; I will instead confine myself to examining
those aspects that help us to understand better Meinong’s position on
fictional aesthetic objects.
From the passage of Lipps the following theses emerge:
(L1) the Mephistus of Goethe’s Faust never existed and, if he did not
exist, he neither uttered the words that Goethe makes him say
nor performed the actions that he makes him perform;
(L2)but it is a fact that we can discuss what Mephistus said and did,
and when we do this, we refer to Mephistus, the one of the lit-
erary story, and not to our or Goethe’s imaginative activity.
How is this possible? And this brings us to a third thesis:
(L3)once he has been called into existence by Goethe, Mephistus
possesses a type of reality that does not have anything to do
with proper reality, a type of reality that Lipps names ‘aesthet-
ic’, and that corresponds to being thought.
It is of little consequence that subsequently Lipps replaces the term
‘aesthetic reality’ with that of ‘aesthetic objectivity’ (ästhetische
Objektivität)22; and we can also disregard his interchangeable use of
the terms ‘existence’ and ‘reality.’ What is however significant is that
Mephistus is according to Lipps an object provided with a specific
kind of reality corresponding to being thought. 
Now, Meinong shares theses (L1) and (L2) in accordance with his
critique of the prejudice in favour of the real, but he disagrees with
(L3). In his opinion, we can talk about an ‘aesthetic reality’ only in a
metaphoric sense. Here is what he says:
Strictly speaking there is only one reality, that of the empirical world, and an
‘aesthetic reality’ that is outside of it is not reality at all23.
22 Cf. Lipps 1906: 28.
23 Meinong 1905: GA I, 599.
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The same can be said for the notion of a ‘simple and indisputable exis-
tence of an object for me in general’, because an existence for me, in
my mind, exists only in the sense of an ‘existing in a representation’,
that is in the sense of a pseudo-existence (as defined by Meinong in the
essay ‘On Objects of Higher Order’24). In such a case, what exists is
the representational act including its content, but Mephistus cannot be
understood as a psychical content, for the simple fact that he possess-
es some properties and accomplishes some actions that can as little be
attributed to a representational content, as being cold and sweet can be
attributed to the psychical representation of a ice-cream25. Despite the
dissent, what remains from Lipps’s lesson is that with reference to
Mephistus, on one hand we are dealing with real psychical experi-
ences, on the other hand with an unreal object. It is a fact that literary
stories arouse in us not only thoughts, but also feelings and emotions,
and that from this we derive aesthetic pleasure. But how can something
unreal, that does not exist, generate real effects, that do nevertheless
exist? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the notion of a
‘given’ (Gegebenes). Meinong observes that generally nobody has any
difficulty accepting that reality represents a ‘given’ to which our intel-
lectual activity is directed, but we are less prepared to consider as a
‘given’ the objects of our aesthetic attitude, because the latter address-
es without distinction both the real and the unreal, and aesthetic objects
are the result of an arbitrary stipulation by the author; in short, we are
not prepared to see a bond (Gebundenheit) beyond existence and non-
existence26. Now, if we consider theses (L1) and (L2), it follows that
even if Mephistus neither exists nor has ever existed, he has some
properties. Meinong develops such a thought from his own point of
view: of objects such as Mephistus it is possible to affirm the so-being
independently from the being – this is the principle of independence.
Moreover, again according to Lipps, what Mephistus says, i.e. his
answer to Faust, ‘does not belong to the past, but to the immediate
present’. For his part, Meinong assimilates this present to that which is
24 Cf. Meinong 1899: GA II, 382-383 (1978: 142).
25 Cf. Meinong 1899: GA II, 383-384 (1978: 142).
26 Cf. Meinong 1905: GA I, 600.
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expressed in the proposition ‘the equilateral triangle has equal angles’,
which means that the present concerned is rather a timelessness – a
characteristic peculiar to non-existing objects.
The action of a drama, even of a historical drama, does not have any strict time
placement, at least not in absolute time, while it [the action] no more lacks rel-
ative time determination than its characters lack the past and also the future27.
Actually, not only is it difficult to identify the temporal (and spatial)
determinations of a literary text (or of a symphony); it is also difficult
to say what constitutes a literary work (or a symphony). Does it coin-
cide with the original manuscript of the work (or of the score), or with
every copy or authentic reproduction of the same? And what shall we
say of ancient texts like Aristotle’s Metaphysics or Machiavelli’s
Prince, whose originals are missing and whose copies differ on sever-
al points? The answer that Meinong suggests is that (M1) the being of
a (literary or also musical) work is not existence at all, but it is a
being which is disconnected from space and time, so that in certain
circumstances the work can also be lost to humanity, but it can never
be deprived of its own being. This audacious thesis is not free from
difficulties.
In fact, if, as regards timelessness, abstract objects (such as geomet-
ric ones) and fictional aesthetic objects show some affinities, from an
epistemological point of view it seems that there are none: while the
proposition concerning the equilaterality of the triangle holds necessar-
ily, the one concerning the words with which Mephistus addresses
Faust does not possess the same character of necessity, because the
words could have been different. This means not only that in the work
of art arbitrariness holds sway, but that our knowledge of aesthetic
objects, as it is mediated by the text, is of the same type as our knowl-
edge of reality, that is empirical – despite the fact that such objects are
unreal. But how is it possible to consider outside of space and time
what can be known only empirically? Let us see how Meinong articu-
lates his thought in response to the objection.
Here the creative activity of the artist comes into play, but we have
to be quite clear about the concept of creation. If aesthetic objects do
27 Meinong 1905: GA I, 601.
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not exist, but are given outside of space and time, then they cannot
even be created.
What the artist ‘creates’ is a more or less composite reality, that has the prop-
erty, for those who apprehend it, to ‘mean’ something more or less composite,
specifically the aesthetic object, which in this way, for those who apprehend
that reality, is picked out from among the infinite totality of the objects out-
side of being and from whose viewpoint it can appropriately be designated as
a predetermined object28.
The passage presupposes Meinong’s semiotic theory presented in
the second chapter of On Assumptions, according to which among lin-
guistic signs, psychical experiences and objects subsist the three rela-
tionships of expressing, presenting and meaning. In short, linguistic
signs (words and propositions) express experiences, that is, respective-
ly, representations and judgments or assumptions; these mean objects,
or more precisely representations mean objecta, judgments and
assumptions mean objectives. Therefore, meanings are always objects;
these are independent of the fact of being apprehended by experiences
or expressed by signs, but they become meanings only if they are pre-
sented to the thought by the corresponding psychical experiences29.
Presenting means offering an object to thought by a psychical experi-
ence30. In this sense, the aesthetic object is the meaning, while the text
is the sign of it.
Creation has to do with the material the artist uses, signs, not objects.
The writer uses real material, words and propositions, in order to sig-
nify an object that is not real, the aesthetic object, which ‘is picked out
from among the infinite totality of the objects outside of being.’ A the-
sis confirmed in On Assumptions:
objects cannot be made by us, but can only be chosen out of the infinite abun-
dance of the objects outside of being (aus der unendlichen Fülle des
Außerseienden)31
28 Meinong 1905: GA I, 603. Cf. also 1915: GA VI, 49 ff., esp. 52 fn. 1.
29 I have dealt with this subject in Raspa 2001. Cf. also Morscher 1973, Dölling
1998 and 2005, Simons & Morscher 2001.
30 Cf. Meinong 1917: GA III, 291 (1972: 6) and passim; cf. also 1910: GA IV, 244
(1983: 177).
31 Meinong 1910: GA IV, 274 (1983: 197); my italics, the translation has been
modified (V.R.).
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This is a consequence of a fundamental view of Meinong’s, that is, that
the object is always the logical prius32. That the aesthetic object is out-
side of being, explains those cases in which we do not have the origi-
nal of a work, but a series of copies that diverge on individual points.
Moreover, as Karl Schuhmann observed, such a view ‘accounts for the
fact that aesthetic properties need not be parts of real objects’ and also
explains the enjoyment of unreal objects, which we can only imagine,
such as those of which literary texts speak; thus it explains aesthetic
pleasure. But since the real object ‘becomes an aesthetic object only
indirectly, namely to the degree it is capable of directing us toward the
aesthetic object itself’33, it would have the disadvantage of doubling
the object of aesthetic experience, since it distinguishes between a real
object and one outside of being. On the other hand, it seems that this is
precisely the situation we are facing: we have a text, that speaks about
something else, a story; the text and the story do not coincide; the point
is to explain how they hold together. This is what Meinong does with
the notions of predetermining reality and predetermined object.
Meinong’s thesis is the following: representations and the real
thoughts of the artist, which through real words and propositions
arouse in the reader equally real representations and thoughts, mediate
between the reader and the aesthetic object outside of being, whose
knowledge and enjoyment, without such a mediation, would be denied
to us. The objects of which a novel talks are genuine non-existing
objects, and not representations in the author’s mind that correspond to
those of the reader; they enter nevertheless into relation with reality,
and this relation consists in the ‘being predetermined’ of objects
through something real34. The artist’s thoughts, which are expressed in
propositions, bring out the object from the Außersein, that is, they ‘pre-
determine’ it. This predetermination should be understood not as a
‘determining previously’, in a chronological sense, because Meinong
maintains that the object is not created, but chosen; on the contrary, it
is a logical predetermination or, if we prefer, a ‘determining for’ – for
32 Cf. Meinong 1917: GA III, 300-301, 354 (1972: 15, 62); 1921: GA VII, 22,
45, 47.
33 Schuhmann 2001: 534.
34 Cf. Meinong 1906-1907: GA V, 254.
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itself and for others35. The predetermining reality works as such not
only as long as it exists, but from the moment in which it begins to
exist, and also in the case in which the knowledge of such a function
and therefore of the predeterminedness itself have been lost. That is,
the predetermined object remains outside of being. The knowledge
about the predetermined object has the character of an empirical
knowledge, inasmuch as one reaches it only through the predetermin-
ing reality, which is of course empirical. But if the nature of an aesthet-
ic object is knowable only empirically (a posteriori), on the basis of
such knowledge – Meinong affirms – its nature can be then attributed
to it analytically. In this way Meinong answers the objection raised
above. What is deducible from the essence, from the so-being of an
object, aside from the fact that the object exists or not, and even if the
way through which we get to know it is empirical, assumes then an
analytical character; it assumes this, not while we are getting to know
the object, but after the cognitive process is concluded. Meinong’s rea-
soning is similar to that introduced by Kant in the Prolegomena to any
Future Metaphysics as regards the judgment ‘Gold is a yellow metal’.
According to Kant 
all analytic judgments are a priori even when the concepts are empirical, as,
for example, ‘Gold is a yellow metal’; for to know this I require no experience
beyond my concept of gold as a yellow metal. It is, in fact, the very concept,
and I need only analyze it, without looking beyond it36.
Likewise – Meinong affirms – we know a diamond empirically, but
once it is known, the property of being nonflammable can be attributed
to it analytically; equally, through Faust we know Mephistus, and what
he says results analytically from the empirically-known nature of
Faust. The timeless present does not pertain to the predetermining real-
ity – Goethe’s thoughts – but to their object37. Therefore, an ‘astonish-
ing sovereignty of poetic or, more generally, artistic imagination’ holds
sway over fictional objects, nevertheless, once assumed – but we could
also say stipulated – that a certain object possesses a certain property,
it then has that property.
35 Cf. Meinong 1905: GA I, 604.
36 Kant 1783: Ak. IV, 267 (1997: 14-15).
37 Cf. Meinong 1905: GA I, 603.
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So, for example, in modern drama, exact information is frequently given as to
the age or other properties of the characters in the play. At first this informa-
tion can only be of the order of assumptions. But once such assumptions are
made, the characters in question are indeed of the indicated age, as if the play-
wright were free to do with them as he wished. He has, in fact, nothing beyond
the right to make analytic judgments in Kant’s sense, according to which the
gold mountain is in fact (tatsächlich) made of gold. In respect to these rights of
poets, being is at disadvantage in relation to so-being38.
Predeterminedness not only pertains to aesthetic objects; actually,
‘every written or spoken discourse predetermines an object, certainly
every thought, whether or not it is expressed in words’39. Our judg-
ments about the world correspond to choices. When we formulate a
judgment and express it in a proposition, we do nothing more than
make a figure emerge from a background of innumerable figures. If I
look before me and I say ‘the bookcase is full, I need another one’, I
bring out a state of affairs, but what I see is much more. I could say
what the bookcase is like, what wood it is made of, what colour, that
one book is standing, another lying flat, and so on. The states of affairs,
or the objectives (in Meinongian terms), are infinite if we consider all
the properties, both positive and negative, that the individual objects in
the bookcase possess40. In this sense, the predeterminedness can also
be lost; this does not change anything as regards the given of the
object, that is of the objective.
On the basis of the fact that predeterminedness proceeds with
absolute predominance and is conditioning both for the subject who
predetermines a certain object and for those people whose intellectual
activity is connected to this subject, Meinong speaks about an analogy
between fictional aesthetic objects and definitions: in both cases there
is a freedom in the predeterminedness that, once made, turns into a
bond; in both cases the predetermined object remains outside of being;
if the definition expresses the analiticity, then it is a judgment; if it
38 Meinong 1917: GA III, 374 (1972: 80); the translation has been modified
(V.R.).
39 Meinong 1905: GA I, 604.
40 Meinong shares the Kantian principle of complete determination; cf. Kant
17811-17872: A 571-572 = B 599-600; Meinong 1915: GA VI, 168 ff.; cf. also
Haller 1986: 76.
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takes part in ‘forming’ a fictional aesthetic object, then it is an assump-
tion41. Leaving aside the cases in which determining object and deter-
mined object seem to coincide, as in the case of an architectural con-
struction or a natural landscape, in substance ‘the true object of an aes-
thetic attitude is not at all touched, at least theoretically, by the exis-
tence of reality, but nevertheless it reveals that peculiar rigid
immutability [Unabänderlichkeit] of the predetermined object’42, an
immutability which is connected to timelessness.
Before concluding this first part of my paper, something more on
Außersein should be said. What is it? It is the sphere of the pure object,
in which its existence or non-existence, possibility or impossibility has
been put in brackets. Certainly, the properties of an object can be
indicative of its being: ‘an absurd object such as a round square carries
in itself the guarantee of its own non-being in every sense’43; neverthe-
less, if we leave aside, as in the case of the objects of stories, their
determinations of being and consider only those of so-being, the
Außersein belongs to all objects, not only to fictitious, absurd or eccen-
tric ones, but also to those that exist and that subsist44. Außersein
embraces therefore all that is ‘given’, that is all possible combinations
among properties and objects45. For example, Meinong says:
besides the factual objective ‘Pitch is black,’ there are (in the sense of
Außersein) also objectives such as ‘Milk is black’46.
In both cases we are combining two objecta into an object of higher
order, which is the corresponding objective of so-being. It is not then
such an eccentric idea: in Death Fugue [Todesfuge] by Paul Celan we
41 Cf. Meinong 1905: GA I, 605; 1910: GA IV, 274 (1983: 197-198).
42 Meinong 1905: GA I, 605.
43 Meinong 1904: GA II, 493 (1960: 86).
44 Cf. Meinong 1917: GA III, 306 (1972: 19); 1921: GA VII, 21 (1974: 228). An
exception is constituted by defective objects (defekte Gegenstände); cf. Meinong
1917: GA III, 304-309 (1972: 18-22); Jacquette 1996: 37 ff.
45 Cf. Meinong 1904: GA II, 492-493, 500 (1960: 85, 92); 1910: GA IV, 80 (1983:
62); 1915: GA VI, 181.
46 Meinong 1910: GA IV: 277 (1983: 199-200).
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read: ‘Black milk of daybreak we drink it at evening / […] Black milk
of daybreak we drink you at night’47.
To have a more plastic idea of Außersein, we can think about
Borges’ Library of Babel, which records all possible combinations of
the twenty-two letters of the alphabet plus the space, the comma and
the full stop; note: not everything possible, but all possible combina-
tions, therefore also those that are eccentric, bizarre and contradictory.
These are the axioms on which the Library is founded:
‘First: The library exists ab eterno’, that is, it has not come into exis-
tence in a certain moment, nor it will end – just like what is outside of
being. ‘Second: The orthographical symbols are twenty-five in num-
ber’48 (the space, the full stop, the comma and the twenty-two letters
of the alphabet), and it also contains eccentric books, such as the one
which repeats the letters M C V from the first line to the last; – the ana-
logue is given by the theory of objects of higher order and by the prin-
ciple of the obligatory infima, with the difference that these are not in
a defined number like that of the Library, even though all that is appre-
hended can also be expressed in linguistic signs, that is with the twen-
ty-five orthographic symbols.
‘This much is already known: – affirms Borges – for every sensible
line of straightforward statement, there are leagues of senseless
cacophonies, verbal jumbles and incoherences’49. – As regards
Meinong, we have eccentric and contradictory objects.
From the axioms on which the Library is founded one can deduce
that: ‘in the vast Library there are no two identical books’, which
means that ‘the Library is total and that its shelves register all the pos-
sible combinations of the twenty-odd orthographical symbols’50 – the
whole infinite abundance (die unendliche Fülle) of the objects outside
of being51.
47 Celan 1952/1983: 41-42 (2001).
48 Borges 1956: 87 (1962).
49 Borges 1956: 88 (1962).
50 Borges 1956: 89 (1962).
51 Borges adds: ‘(a number which, though extremely vast, is not infinite)’, the
same does not hold for the Außersein.
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‘I repeat: – it suffices that a book be possible for it to exist. Only the
impossible is excluded – explains Borges –. For example: no book can
be a ladder, although no doubt there are books which discuss and
negate and demonstrate this possibility and others whose structure cor-
responds to that of a ladder’52. – Also for Meinong impossible objects
do not exist, but are outside of being, and yet people talk about them,
which means that they too belong to the ‘given’.
If a representation or a thought could have an object only if this
object were something which is, i.e. which exists or subsists, then
those representations and thoughts that are not directed to beings (as in
the case of literary fiction), would have no object at all; but this con-
tradicts intentionality thesis, so strongly assumed by Meinong that it
excludes the possibility of a pseudo-relation in the case of fictitious
entities. The solution proposed by Meinong is to cut the bond between
objectuality and existence or being; this can be done if the object is
considered as outside of being53.
3. Having ascertained that the aesthetic object is not the real object
– the text – but rather the object outside of being – that is, the meaning
of the real object –, we return to the question: how can something unre-
al like a fictional object arouse real emotions and feelings? Inasmuch
as it enters into connection with real objects, that is with the material
that, manipulated by the artist, constitutes the work of art. Explaining
how this is possible implies the answer to the second question: what
kind of objects are fictional aesthetic objects? As concerns literary
texts, Meinong’s thesis is that (M2) the true fictional aesthetic objects
are objectives54, which are apprehended by assumptions.
In a certain sense we have anticipated this answer in our brief out-
line of Meinong’s semiotic theory: texts are made up of words and
propositions, which mean objecta and objectives, which take on the
role of meanings, in that they are presented either by representations or
by judgments and assumptions. Below I will speak about psychical
52 Borges 1956: 93 fn. 1 (1962).
53 Cf. Meinong 1910: GA IV, 233-234 (1983: 170).
54 Cf. Meinong 1910: GA IV, 318, 319 (1983: 227, 228); 1917: GA III, 372 (1972:
79).
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experiences and aesthetic feelings not because these are the direct sub-
ject of my discourse, which focuses instead on ontological questions,
but because the psychological treatment constitutes, according to
Meinong, the access route to the ontological treatment of aesthetic
objects: we have said that the way we approach aesthetic objects is
empirical, only later can we pass over to the aprioristic treatment; the
thesis should be proved through the analysis of the empirical material
that puts us in contact with aesthetic objects, that is then the only mate-
rial which is in first place accessible to us.
Let us first of all define assumptions, relating them to judgements
and representations. Judgment possesses the two moments of convic-
tion and position, which means that it claims truth and is either affir-
mative or negative; besides this, it also needs representations as its
essential fundaments, because every event of the psychical life, which
is not itself a representation, presupposes the representing55. Assump-
tions occupy an intermediate position between representations and
judgments56: they are affirmative or negative like judgments, but with-
out claiming truth like representations57. Assumptions are expressed
by interrogative, optative, and imperative propositions, by subordinate
clauses (daß-Sätze) that occur in propositions such as ‘I fear, I suppose,
I contend that p’58, in hypothetical reasoning, in lies, in games and in
narrative works. In all such cases the conviction that the object exists
is not required.
According to Meinong, also our attitude toward the aesthetic object
does not demand at all the belief that it exists. Previously, he had main-
tained that our aesthetic attitude is based above all on representing,
because the judgment has as its peculiarity the moment of conviction;
but he decidedly changed his mind when he discovered assumptions
which, insofar as they lack the moment of conviction, can take the
place of judgments and express objectives that – as we have said – are
55 Cf. Meinong 1902: 1-3, 256; 1910: GA IV, 1-4, 46, 339 (1983: 9-11, 39, 242);
1917: GA III, 290, 294 (1972: 6, 9).
56 Cf. Meinong 1902: 277; 1910: GA IV, 367 (1983: 262).
57 Cf. Meinong 1902: 257; 1910: GA IV, 3, 340, 368 (1983: 10, 242, 262-263);
1921: GA VII, 33.
58 Cf. Meinong 1902: 26 ff.; 1910: GA IV, 33 ff. (1983: 30 ff.)
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also objects of aesthetic feelings, for whose expression representations
are therefore inadequate. Hence the value attributed to assumptions. In
On Assumptions there are different arguments to support the aforesaid
thesis, i.e. that (M2) the true aesthetic objects are objectives and that
these are apprehended by assumptions. I will introduce three of them;
the first dates back to the first edition (1902), the others appear in the
second (1910).
The first argument (M2a) concerns the assumptions themselves.
These occur – as we said – in the cases of fiction, within the realm of
‘as if’, and conspicuously in lies, in games and, as far as we are inter-
ested, in art59. There is a close analogy between the game of the child,
who ‘pretends’ (fingiert) or ‘imagines’ (sich einbildet) to be somebody
else, and art, particularly the art of acting. But, if we consider the point
of view of the writer, he too, while creating the work, puts himself in
the place of all the people he represents; sometimes he tells true sto-
ries, but what he mostly deals with is fiction and ‘fiction is just
assumption’60. Let us now put ourselves in the reader’s place: what
happens to the reader reading a story he does not believe, because he
knows that the story never happened? Although not believing it, while
reading he makes the same assumptions as the narrator; obviously, this
does not exclude an elaboration of the material assumed by the reader.
Certainly, as I said above, the narrator does not express only assump-
tions, but he can also express true judgments; the effect on the reader
is often however identical and even if the narrator enunciates truths,
the reader does not have to accept them as they are. Anyway, Meinong
concludes, we stay on the level of assumptions61. Subsequently, in On
Emotional Presentation [Über emotionale Präsentation] (1917),
Meinong develops a distinction that accounts for this difference, dis-
tinguishing between ‘shadowy’ assumptions and assumptions that are
similar to judgments. I will not discuss this matter here, as I will not
deal with the indeterminedness of fictional objects, even if discussing
them would help to give a more complete picture of the whole matter62.
64 Fictional and Aesthetic Objects: Meinong
59 Cf. Meinong 1902: 36-37; 1910: GA IV, 107 (1983: 81).
60 Meinong 1902: 45; 1910: GA IV, 115 (1983: 86).
61 Cf. Meinong 1902: 57-60; 1910: GA IV, 127-130 (1983: 94-97).
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For our purposes, two points are fundamental: first, wherever there are
assumptions, there are objectives too63, because objectives are the
objects of assumptions, as of judgments; and since in literature we are
dealing primarily with assumptions, though judgments are not exclud-
ed, objectives are the true aesthetic objects of narrative works; the sec-
ond point is that assumptions play a prominent role in art64, since our
attitude toward aesthetic objects does not demand at all the conviction
that these exist, and indeed the objectives that occur in art works are
not generally believed, but assumed.
The second argument (M2b) examines the representations. Those
expressed in a literary text are produced or imaginary representations,
at most they can be reproductions65; in every case we are dealing with
composite representations, to which correspond, from an ontological
point of view, objects of higher order, that is complexes66. But an
objective is implicit in every complex; therefore, to grasp a fictional
complex we need to grasp the objective implicit in it. The reasoning
which supports this thesis was suggested to Meinong by Russell67: in
the object of the form ‘A and B in the complex C’ there is already pres-
ent an objective of the form ‘the complex that is constituted by A and
B’, or ‘A, which with B constitutes a certain complex’, even if the form
tends to hide it. So ‘where there is a complex, there is also an objective
as an integrating factor in it, and one who wants to apprehend the com-
plex cannot do it otherwise than by apprehending the objective’68. That
is why representing is not sufficient to apprehend objects of higher
order, whether they are objects or objectives, but assuming is the most
suitable experience to apprehend aesthetic objects, and again it follows
that these are mainly objectives.
This thesis (M2), which Meinong maintains in the first edition of On
Assumptions and reasserts in the second, is firmly opposed by Stephan
Witasek, one of Meinong’s pupils, who in his Outlines of General
63 Cf. Meinong 1910: GA IV, 131 (1983: 98).
64 Cf. Meinong 1902: 210-211; 1910: GA IV, 168-169 (1983: 124).
65 Cf. Meinong 1910: GA IV, 11, 16, 377-378 (1983: 15, 18-19, 269).
66 On this cf. Raspa 2005a.
67 Cf. Russell 1904/1973: 50 ff.
68 Meinong 1910: GA IV: 280 (1983: 202).
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Aesthetics [Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik] (1904) developed a
structured theory which, though it agrees on the whole with Meinong’s
view, diverges from it concerning the role of objectives and assump-
tions69. But before discussing Witasek, let us briefly examine the third
argument (M2c) by which Meinong answers the question about the
effects of aesthetic objects.
(M2c) According to Meinong, besides intermediate mental facts
between representations and judgments, that is assumptions, there are
also intermediate mental facts between representations and feelings,
such as the feelings related to works of art, which Meinong calls ‘phan-
tasy-feelings (Phantasiegefühle),’ and which arise for example when a
tragedy evokes fear or compassion70. As assumptions resemble judg-
ments in virtue of the opposition of affirmation and negation, but they
are not judgments, so phantasy-feelings are feelinglike in virtue of the
opposition of pleasure and displeasure, but they are not real feelings.
At the theatre the spectator does indeed experience something in him-
self, for example something similar to compassion, which however is
not literally compassion. The compassion for the tragic heroine
Margaret is not only of a lower degree, but even qualitatively different
from the compassion that I feel for an unhappy girl whose sad tale I
know71. It is necessary to distinguish between phantasy-feelings and
aesthetic feelings, which are genuine feelings, for instance aesthetic
enjoyment. Indeed, phantasy-feelings, together with assumptions, play
a fundamental role in the arousal of aesthetic feelings. From reading
works of art arise also phantasy-desires (Phantasiebegehrungen), as
when one wishes a novel to end in a certain way, and also these are no
more genuine desires than phantasy-feelings are genuine feelings. The
presuppositions for such mental phantasy-experiences are assump-
tions, which are expressed by the propositions of the work, but they
69 A reading of Witasek’s aesthetics is given by Smith 1996 and Schuhmann 2001.
According to Schuhmann (2001: 518), ‘Witasek’s theory is based on Meinong’s
early general theory of value as worked out mainly in Meinong’s Psychological-
Ethical Investigation on Value Theory from 1894.’ Cf. also Schuhmann 2001:
533.
70 Cf. Meinong 1910: GA IV, 309 (1983: 221).
71 Cf. Meinong 1910: GA IV, 312, 316-317 (1983: 223, 226).
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refer to objectives72. Therefore, assumptions go beyond the intellectu-
al sphere and extend to the emotional one; it follows that objectives
belong also to phantasy-feelings and phantasy-desires. Hence, since
objectives considered as aesthetic objects arouse in us feelings and
emotions, they are also often objects of our emotional activity.
Witasek recognizes the value of objectives, but he does not believe
that they are aesthetic objects73. Like Meinong, Witasek believes that
objectives play a fundamental role in the narrative arts, since novels,
plays and poems are composed of propositions and, to understand and
enjoy a literary text, it is necessary to understand the objectives meant
by propositions74. Certainly, objects of representation also play their
part, because no objective can subsist without objecta, but they play a
more indirect role, since every reader imagines what is described dif-
ferently, nor is it necessary that he should imagine it in a distinct way.
The main role is played by situations, events, narrated facts and, along
with them, by the relations subsisting between the characters and
objects of the story. ‘But these are objectives, not objects of represen-
tation’75. What has aesthetic effectiveness in a literary work is in the
first place its content, and this is constituted by the meanings of the sin-
gle propositions which – as we know – correspond to objectives.
Nevertheless, Witasek maintains that (W1) ‘objectives are not, as it
appears at first sight, the genuine aesthetic objects, on the contrary
they are mediators of aesthetic objects’76. If we mean by ‘aesthetic
object’ what our feeling of pleasure and displeasure is directed to,
then, since this feeling is never directed to an objective, which is nei-
ther beautiful nor ugly, the objective cannot be an aesthetic object. The
72 Cf. Meinong 1910: GA IV, 313-315 (1983: 224-225).
73 At first, Witasek (1904: 53 ff.) puts objectives in the class of the so-called ‘aes-
thetic elementary objects (ästhetische Elementargegenstände),’ that is objects
‘whose aesthetic qualities do not come down to the sum of the aesthetic qualities
of the components of the object, but belong only to the object as a whole and are
lost when one analyses it’ (p. 35); however, after a careful critical examination –
briefly presented above –, he excludes them (p. 179).
74 Cf. Witasek 1904: 56.
75 Witasek 1904: 57.
76 Witasek 1904: 167-168; my italics (V.R.).
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aesthetic quality, the beauty of a literary work depends not only on its
language and style, but undoubtedly on its content, and finally on the
objectives in which it consists, since those who do not understand the
content of a work cannot say they have enjoyed it. Yet, an objective is
not beautiful in itself, but it is mediator of beauty. The aesthetic prop-
erties of a work depend on objectives, ‘as the perfume of flowers on
the wind that blows’77, says Witasek.
Witasek distinguishes an epistemological level and an aesthetic one.
An objective contains the objects of representations and it serves to
describe facts and situations, in which – to put it colloquially – we
always speak about people and things. The objective is therefore fun-
damental for the understanding of the work, since understanding a
work – as aforesaid – means understanding the objectives of the propo-
sitions that compose it. Nevertheless the aesthetic effectiveness of an
objective depends on the words and the representations through which
it is communicated to the subject or thought by him; and only if words
and representations have aesthetic properties, do objectives also pos-
sess them, but only indirectly. What counts is the choice of the expres-
sions, their position, etc.78. To demonstrate this, Witasek advances two
arguments.
(W1a) First of all, for the aesthetic effect it is important how an
objective is expressed. Witasek therefore invites us to transform a line
of poetry into a non poetic form but with the same meaning, i.e. the
same objective – in short, to translate it into prose: naturally the line
loses all aesthetic value. The aesthetic properties of the saying ‘youth
is a garland of roses, old age a crown of thorns’, depend on the words
and the representations expressed by them. If we paraphrase it in this
way: ‘In youth life is easy, happy and cheerful, in old age difficult and
lacking in pleasures, but in exchange it is venerable’, the objective
loses aesthetic effectiveness. (Leaving aside the additions, Witasek
believes that the two propositions express the same objective.) The
thought of the objective enriches the material of representation and
hence the material which arouses aesthetic feelings in us, but the objec-
tive is not the direct object of our aesthetic attitude79.
68 Fictional and Aesthetic Objects: Meinong
77 Witasek 1904: 169.
78 Cf. Witasek 1904: 170-171.
79 Cf. Witasek 1904: 171-173.
(W1b) The second argument put forward by Witasek to show that
objectives are only mediators pertains to feelings, which are in the case
of the narrative arts above all empathy-feelings (Einfühlungsgefühle)
and sympathy-feelings (Anteilsgefühle). The former are feelings
through which a person who reads, for instance, the scene of ‘Margaret
in jail’ feels with the heroine what she feels: torment, confidence, pious
resignation, desperation; while the latter are the liking and the compas-
sion that the reader feels for Margaret. In the first case, the subject
reproduces in himself the psychical life of the object (Margaret), in the
second he reacts emotionally to the object80. These feelings occur
where there are objectives, which again act as mediators: through them
feelings are aroused in fact in the reader, and only inasmuch as the
objectives do this, do they have aesthetic effectiveness81 – which, as
we know, depends on the words and the objects of representations.
Moreover, if the feeling of aesthetic pleasure were immediately direct-
ed at the objectives, then judgments and assumptions should be the
presupposition of such a feeling, but judgments and assumptions –
Witasek maintains – play such a role in the case of value-feelings (like
loving, appreciating, honouring) and knowledge-feelings (doubting,
understanding); if they were the presupposition of aesthetic feelings
too, the difference between the former and the latter would disappear.
This difference consists not in the fact that value-feelings are based on
the real world, and phantasy-feelings on the world of imagination; on
the contrary, phantasy-feelings are also real, they are characterized by
the specificity of their presupposition, namely assumptions, so they are
always assumptive feelings82. Not only, but often assumptions too can
act as premises for value-feelings, as when I imagine that I can lose my
brother and I regret it; in this case, we have a phantasy-feeling of value.
Equally it is not excluded that a judgment can arouse aesthetic feelings.
The difference between value-feelings and aesthetic feelings lies in the
fact that the former have objectives as object, while the latter have
objecta, that is the objects of representations.
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80 Cf. Witasek 1904: 148-149. On empathy-feelings and sympathy-feelings cf.
Smith 1996: 220 ff.
81 Cf. Witasek 1904: 174-175.
82 Cf. Witasek 1904: 120-121 fn..
The aesthetic attitude is not directed to objectives at all, but primarily to
the objects of representation that they communicate (vermitteln) to the
subject83.
Witasek’s thesis (W1) is diametrically opposed to Meinong’s thesis
(M2); we see now how the latter answers the criticisms. A part of
Meinong’s reply (MR) to Witasek’s first criticism (W1a) is already
implicit in the second argument we have seen above (M2b), that is, that
objectives are implied in the complex objects of representations. (MR-
W1a) As regards language, Meinong argues that, indeed, after having
transformed a poem into prose, there is very little poetry left in it; the
question is, however, whether this transformation has not also changed
the objective. One who confers aesthetic dignity on a certain objective,
neither sees it deprived of its objectum-material, nor expressed in a
passing form, where within certain limits there is no modification of
the material. Rather, the aesthetic significance is dependent on the
determinations of the real material, and precisely on those referred to
by Witasek. The fact remains however that, for the reasons rehearsed
above, the true aesthetic object is the objective84. Meinong maintains
therefore a close relationship between objective and the linguistic form
that expresses it – paraphrase is not admitted in poetry –, but he does
not say anything to explain this thesis, leaving the reader disappointed.
For instance, the problem of translation remains open, a problem that
the theory of objectives on the other hand seems to face; besides,
Meinong himself maintains that the same objective can be expressed in
different forms: ‘A exists’ is equivalent to ‘the existence of A’85. 
As regards Witasek’s second argument (W1b), Meinong’s reply is
structured in two parts. (MR-W1b') Firstly, he contests the equality
between phantasy-feelings and assumptive feelings, as well as the
notion that phantasy-feelings are real feelings. Now, that they are not
real feelings is shown by the fact that – as we said – the compassion
towards Margaret is both of lower degree and qualitatively different
from the compassion for an unfortunate girl who is really living. That
they are not simply assumptive feelings can be deduced from the
83 Witasek 1904: 179.
84 Cf. Meinong 1910: GA IV, 318-319 (1983: 227-228).
85 Cf. Meinong 1910: GA IV, 56 (1983: 46); 1915: GA VI, 27-28 and fn. 3.
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consideration that many phantasy-feelings are not founded on assump-
tions, as when we remember a strong toothache or a person’s death;
therefore, the sphere of assumptive feelings is narrower than that of
phantasy-feelings86. The second part of the argument (MR-W1b'') is
far more important. Witasek believes that feelings which have objec-
tives as their object can only be value-feelings, not aesthetic feelings.
Now, according to Meinong, value-feelings are always directed to
being, in the first place to existence, obviously also to the existence of
something that is thus and so, to its properties, in every case to exis-
tence. This does not hold for aesthetic feelings: they always bear on so-
being, accidentally also on the so-being of something existing, and this
so clearly that the kind of treatment from which they arise can be con-
sidered existence-free (daseinsfrei). This point of the existence-free-
dom (Daseinsfreiheit) is fundamental: whether something exists or not
is never a concern of the aesthetic attitude, rather the converse hap-
pens, that is, that something which can also exist is thus and so;
instead, value-feeling is always turned toward an existing thing, even
if it is determined in a certain way. Hence, against Witasek, the essence
of value-feelings does not depend on judgment and assumption, but
always on the nature of the objective. If feeling is directed to the being,
it is a value-feeling, if it is directed to the so-being, it is an aesthetic
feeling. Certainly, there are value-feelings that are directed to objecta
such as a color or a form, and not to objectives, but an objective of so-
being is implicit in qualitative determinations87. It follows that every
aesthetic feeling is directed to objectives, if not explicitly, at least
implicitly88.
It is evident that the contrast between the two authors on the role of
the objective, which was underlined with the opposition of (W1b) and
(MR-W1b), depends on different conceptions (here very briefly
sketched) as regards feelings in their various forms. I do not intend to
develop this matter further, which – as aforesaid – is not specifically of
an ontological character; I wanted however to mention it, because,
according to both authors, in this way one comes to speak of aesthetic
objects.
86 Cf. Meinong 1910: GA IV, 316-317 (1983: 226-227).
87 Indeed, as we saw above (M2b), an objective is always implicit in a complex.
88 Cf. Meinong 1910: GA IV, 319-320 (1983: 228-229).
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4. Hitherto we have spoken of aesthetic objects as a proper class of
fictional objects, now the question arises of their specificity relative to
fictional objects in general, insofar as it is obvious that not all fiction-
al objects are also aesthetic objects. So we come to the third question:
what makes a fictional object an aesthetic one? And here another point
of divergence between Meinong and Witasek emerges, perhaps even
more fundamental than the previous one: (W2) aesthetic objects are
not objects of higher order. This thesis, if proven, would significantly
reduce the claims to universality of the object theory as regards aes-
thetic objects: objects of higher order are both objectives and objects
of phantasy-representations, that is complexes.
In the Outlines of General Aesthetics, Witasek states that ‘an object
becomes an aesthetic object, if it is bearer of aesthetic properties’89. Of
these the most characteristic is ‘beauty’, which, like the others, ‘proves
to be not a real property of its bearer, but an ideal one’90. The beauty
of a picture, indeed, is not perceivable as the picture and the masses of
colour are; if we listen to a melody or a poem, we hear sounds or
words, but beauty consists neither in the individual sounds or words
nor it is added as something existing alongside them. Moreover, beau-
ty is not an objectual property of the object, that is, a property which,
like real properties, is represented together (mitvorgestellt) with the
representation of the object and can then describe it: for example, the
colour is an objectual property of the picture but the similarity of this
with a copy is not.
So beauty is also an extra-objectual determination of its bearer, though rightly
it is designated as a property of the latter; even a representation, however com-
plete, of an object does not need to contain the thought of beauty, at least inso-
far as it intends to be only the representation of this object91.
Again, in the Outlines of General Aesthetics Witasek had said that an
object is aesthetic when it is the object to which our feeling of pleas-
ure and displeasure is directed, a definition that obviously depends on
that given above.
89 Witasek 1904: 27.
90 Witasek 1904: 14.
91 Witasek 1904: 15-16.
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In his last writing, ‘On Aesthetic Objectivity [Über ästhetische
Objektivität]’ (1915), as regards aesthetic judgment, ‘This (object) is
beautiful (not beautiful, ugly, etc.)’, Witasek maintains that 
In making the judgment ‘A is beautiful’, one is not normally thinking about a
relationship of A with the subject, with their emotional reaction, nor about this
same emotional reaction; one means a property of A, that is entirely in the same
object A.92.
If we call the object A ‘substratum’, we can say that the aesthetic
object consists in this substratum taken together with the aesthetic
properties. The bearer of these qualities is not however the transcen-
dent real (existing) object, but the immanent (pseudo-existing) object,
and likewise aesthetic properties are only an objectual part of this
immanent object. Witasek expressly denies that the bearer can be an
existing or subsisting object, insofar as he believes that the evidence of
certainty regarding aesthetic judgment holds only for the immanent
object93. The essential characteristics of an aesthetic object are the
non-independence (Unselbständigkeit) from the substratum, which
means that the being of an aesthetic object is founded on the being of
another or other objects, and the dependence (Abhängigkeit) on varia-
tions of the substratum. An aesthetic property such as ‘beautiful’
requires indeed not only, like the property ‘red’, a substratum to belong
to, but also a property or a complex of properties as its basis, without
which it could not be and on whose nature it is dependent. Indeed, if
one or more elements of the substratum change, the object can change
from beautiful to ugly. Changing some notes of a melody, for instance,
it can become less beautiful or even ugly94. This dependence is unidi-
rectional in the sense that the aesthetic property is dependent on the
substratum and on its properties, not vice versa. This specific depend-
ence relation makes the difference between aesthetic properties and
sensory properties: the colour red needs an extension, but it does not
vary with the variations of the latter; furthermore, while the aesthetic
property can vary if sensory properties like colours vary, the converse
does not hold. However, a short consideration will bring out evident
92 Witasek 1915: 91-92.
93 Cf. Witasek 1915: 94, 96-98.
94 Cf. Witasek 1915: 105, 108, 110-112.
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analogies between aesthetic properties and objects of higher order such
as, for example, similarity. Indeed, similarity does not occur without
similar objects; moreover, whether, and to what extent, two objects are
similar, depends on the nature of the objects. Therefore aesthetic prop-
erties seem to be ideal objects of higher order95. But four factors lead
us to exclude this possibility. Witasek is speaking only of beauty, but
his discourse can also be extended to other aesthetic properties.
First of all, (W2a) thinking back to the example of similarity,
Witasek observes that this is between the two members, for example
red and orange, with which it builds a complex; beauty is instead on
the red-orange complex: if the difference is removed, the two colours
are each for itself, while if beauty is removed, the complex remains.
Besides, (W2b) beauty does not need a plurality of inferiora, as objects
of higher order do, but a unity that can be, in turn, both complex and
simple; for objects of higher order, though, being based on a unity is a
limiting case (that of identity)96. In third place, (W2c) objects of high-
er order are tied to their inferiora by a bond of aprioristic necessity:
given red and orange, they are necessarily different or similar (accord-
ing to their gradation); while there is no necessity relationship between
the two colours and beauty. Finally, (W2d) difference is not thinkable
intuitively (anschaulich), while beauty is intuitively apprehended
through its bearer (melody, picture, poem); in other words, the differ-
ence between two empirical objects is actively produced by the subject
through an operation of comparison, the beauty of a perceptive object
is instead passively accomplished. For all these reasons, beauty cannot
be considered as an ideal object of higher order97. But if beauty is not
something real close to the object, and it is not an ideal object of high-
er order, then it neither exists nor subsists. Hence, there must be either
a new class of objects which have till now not been contemplated by
object theory, but which subsist objectively like ideal objects of high-
er order, or a third type of being, which Witasek does not identify with
the Außersein, but with the immanent being98. 
95 Cf. Witasek 1915: 112-114.
96 Cf. Meinong 1899: GA II, 394 (1978: 149).
97 Cf. Witasek 1915: 180-183.
98 Cf. Witasek 1915: 191-192, 198.
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If the later Witasek is right, much of Meinong’s theory concerning
aesthetic objects comes apart. It is therefore absolutely necessary for
him to reply to his friend and pupil. He does so by accepting the first
part of Witasek’s discourse, according to which an aesthetic object is
non-independent of being and dependent on the so-being, and rebutting
the criticisms made by him99. However, Meinong does not answer each
of the four criticisms separately, but he develops a single argument, in
which he examines the first two, of a strongly ontological character,
while he replies very quickly to the last two (of a gnoseological char-
acter), concerning the lack of aprioristic necessity and of productive
activity.
Meinong faces the main theoretical difficulty raised by Witasek
against the thesis according to which (M3) aesthetic objects are objects
of higher order, more precisely they are complex bearers of beauty, that
is, the oneness (Einsheit) of the substratum required by aesthetic prop-
erties (as W2a and W2b maintain). I note in advance that Meinong
identifies Witasek’s error as his having considered objects of higher
order only from the point of view of objecta, and not also from that of
objectives. His refutation (MR-W2a-b) can be divided into three steps:
(1) objectives are also objects of higher order;
(2) there are objectives that are not based on a plurality of inferiora;
therefore,
(3) if not all objects of higher order need a plurality of
inferiora,then there is no difficulty in considering aesthetic
objects as objects of higher order.
Let us examine the argument in detail.
(1) The theory of objects of higher order was initially formulated from
the point of view of objecta, but also objectives are objects of higher
order. For instance, compared to the objective ‘A is B,’ ‘it is a fact that
A is B’ is an objective of higher order. Hence, ‘each objective is an
objective of higher order with respect to another objective if the latter
occupies the place of the objectum in the former’100. The objective is
99 Cf. Meinong 1917: GA III, 387-388 (1972: 92-93).
100 Meinong 1917: GA III, 389 (1972: 94).
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also an object of higher order with respect to the objecta of which it is
constituted, like the objective ‘A is B’ with respect to the objecta A and
B; therefore, ‘all objectives as such are objects of higher order’101. 
As regards the height of order, it holds that objects of higher order
are built on objects of lower order in such a way that the former could
not be there, if the latter were not there at first. The ‘at first’ indicates
a logical priority, not a chronological one. This holds both for objecta
and for objectives. An objective is necessarily based on some material,
which may, in its turn, contain other objectives, but these are ultimate-
ly based on objecta. That means that objectives can never occupy the
position of infima. 
(2) Relations and complexes certainly require at least two elements;
the same holds for objectives of so-being of the type ‘A is B’; but
objectives of being (‘A is’), of existence (‘A exists’), of subsistence
(even of Außersein) are monadic by nature, and it does not make any
difference that they can be based both on a simple and on a complex
substratum of objecta. This being so, it is wrong to extend to all objects
of higher order a characteristic that is common to relations and com-
plexes, that is, that they need a plurality of inferiora102.
(3) If not all objects of higher order need a plurality of inferiora, the
main obstacle to considering aesthetic objects as objects of higher
order, that is the oneness of substratum, no longer subsists. Their
dependence on the substrata is a sign – just as Witasek showed – of the
superius character of aesthetic objects, which – Meinong concludes –
‘are indeed subsumable under the notion of objects of higher order’103.
As regards Witasek’s criticism of a gnoseological character (W2c
and W2d), Meinong’s reply is very short and also vague. Regarding the
first, (RM-W2c) Meinong denies that the bond of aprioristic necessity
between inferiora and superius is a proper character of all objects of
higher order: leaving aside real complexes and relations, it would be
enough to consider objectives concerning non-aprioristic knowl-
edge104. As for the other criticism, (RM-W2d) Meinong replies simply
101 Meinong 1917: GA III, 390 (1972: 94).
102 Cf. Meinong 1917: GA III, 390-391 (1972: 95).
103 Meinong 1917: GA III, 391-392 (1972: 95).
104 Cfr. Meinong 1917: GA III, 391 (1972: 95)
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that the productive activity of the subject arises in apprehending
objects of higher order in very different ways: if such productive activ-
ity cannot be disregarded in the comparative apprehension of a differ-
ence, it is however not noticeable with certainty in the apprehension,
for instance, of a melody105.
Lipps made his criticisms from a point of view external to object the-
ory, Witasek from an internal one; both acknowledge that fictional aes-
thetic objects have a kind of mental existence, which is denied by
Meinong. For him fictional aesthetic objects do not exist, but they are
disconnected from space and time (M1); besides, like all fictional
objects, they are objectives which are apprehended by assumptions, or
they require an objective, in that this is implicit in every complex rep-
resentational objectum (M2); finally, they are specific objects of high-
er order, more precisely they are beauty-bearing complexes (M3).
To conclude, it should be specified that, despite the differences we
have examined, Meinong’s and Witasek’s considerations do agree on
many points. The divergences are the result of the different focus of
their respective discourses: Witasek has the tendency to consider as
aesthetic objects not only the objects of literature, but also those of
music and of the visual arts – as the few examples given imply –, he
lacks however a broader perspective, which he infers when necessary
from Meinong; Meinong, on the other hand, concentrates almost
exclusively on fictional objects (with some excursions into music),
which he tries to frame within the wide compass constituted by the
object theory. Insofar as the two demands are unifiable, both Meinong
and Witasek developed only a part of the work.
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